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1. Introduction 
 
Party regulation has acquired momentum. A growing number of European states 
have adopted legislation on political parties, either imposing restrictions or conferring 
privileges to them. Moreover, party regulation is increasingly being portrayed as a cru-
cial regulatory instrument for the promotion of democracy and its values and as a 
means by which parties can re-establish their political legitimacy and regain citizens’ 
trust. Yet, some critics have argued that rather than constituting a tool for enhancing 
democratic processes and restoring legitimacy, party regulation constitutes an instru-
ment that political parties can exploit in their own advantage for entrenching the elec-
toral position of established groups and self-perpetuating the political status quo (Pal-
tiel 1979). The introduction of rules providing state funding to political parties was ob-
served by Katz and Mair as a key indicator of an instrumental use of party legislation 
aimed to strengthen the parties’ position within the state while compensating for their 
weakening linkages with society (1995). This article draws attention to another indica-
tor possibly pointing in the same direction: it concentrates on the functional definitions 
of political parties. Indeed, beyond determining who is entitled to be recognized as a 
political party, what forms of activity parties may engage and what forms of internal 
organization and political behavior are acceptable for parties (Katz 2004, 2-3), party 
regulation also includes provisions that define party functions. 
Building on a comprehensive database of party regulation in Europe,1 this article 
highlights the presence of these definitions and speculates as to why such non-
prescriptive statements have been introduced. It suggests that references to the par-
ties’ ‘eufunctions’ are a means by which legislators (the parties themselves) aim to self-
legitimize their institutional centrality and justify the introduction of state subsidies. By 
doing so, this article aims to contribute to a reflection on the endogenous nature of 
party regulation and on the complex interaction between legal rules, politics, and de-
mocracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 Re-conceptualizing Party Democracy is a research project funded by the European Research Council (ERC) 
and based at Leiden University. The database includes 33 democracies in Eastern and Western Europe 
(www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl). 
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2. Party law: approaches and challenges 
 
Party law is defined as “the total body of law that affects political parties” (Müller 
and Sieberer 2006, 435). Such laws are numerous, and include electoral acts regulating 
the selection of the parties’ candidates for public office; media acts concerning rules of 
party access to broadcasting channels, as well as other types of regulation such as of 
administrative rulings, legislative statutes, and court decisions. However, Constitutions, 
Party Laws, and Party Finance Laws are commonly observed as the main sources of 
party regulation, as they are specifically concerned with matters of party affairs (van 
Biezen 2008).  
Party regulation in Europe has increased considerably since the end of the Second 
World War, as a growing number of countries have included references to political par-
ties in their Constitutions and have adopted specific legislation defining the operation, 
the functioning and the financial management of political parties. With the exception 
of Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands, all European countries have in-
cluded references to political parties in their Constitutions (van Biezen and Borz 2012); 
23 countries introduced a specific law regulating political finance; and 21 countries 
adopted a specific law on political parties (Piccio 2012). All in all, as Katz remarked, po-
litical parties have become “legitimate objects of state regulation to a degree far ex-
ceeding what would normally be acceptable for private associations in a liberal society” 
(Katz 2004, 90).  
Concomitantly to the growing regulation of political parties and in the light of the 
importance that party regulation has for structuring the functioning of representative 
democracies in which political parties play a pivotal role, research on the subject has 
increased significantly in recent years. Three main approaches to party regulation can 
be identified: regulation in terms of its substantive content; regulation as an independ-
ent variable; and regulation as a dependent variable.  
In terms of the substantive content of legal provisions, both legal scholars and politi-
cal scientists have been analyzing how political parties are being regulated (Kommers 
1997; Tsatsos, Schefold, Schneider 1990). In the first comprehensive comparative anal-
ysis of party laws, Karvonen identified three main areas subject to party regulation: re-
strictions, including various types of bans or limitations on the orientation, activity, and 
organization of parties; definition of political parties as organizations, regulating the 
internal procedures, party registration, and financial management; and sanctions 
providing the right of the state to punish parties by legal means (2007). More recent 
research, embracing a larger number of sources of party law, has shown that the regu-
lation of political parties touches on an even wider spectrum of party activities, includ-
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ing their internal organization, registration and statutory requirements, ideological 
connotations, external functioning and behavior, internal financial management and 
external control (Gauja 2010; van Biezen and Borz 2012; van Biezen and Piccio 2013; 
Casal Bértoa, Piccio and Rashkova 2015).  
A second group of scholars has looked at party regulation as an independent varia-
ble. Scholars have mostly concentrated on the effects of party regulation on party sys-
tem dynamics, such as competition (Scarrow 2006), development (Pierre, Svåsand, and 
Widfeldt 2000), and new party entry (Tavits 2006; Bolin 2007; van Biezen and Rashkova 
2012). Research has been particularly concerned to search for evidence of the cartel 
party thesis proposed by Katz and Mair, focusing on the degree to which regulations 
effectively constrain democratic processes, as the two authors suggested.2 Others have 
observed the effects of party regulation on political corruption (Casal Bértoa, Mo-
lenaar, Piccio, and Rashkova 2014), trust (Witheley 2014), electoral volatility (Casas-
Zamora 2006), party membership (Whiteley 2011), as well as on the organizational de-
velopment of individual parties (Casal Bértoa and Spirova 2013; Nassmacher 2009; van 
Biezen 2003). 
Finally, scholars have considered party regulation as a dependent variable. The 
recognition that party regulation by no means developed to the same extent or in the 
same form in all European democracies, and that in some countries political parties are 
heavily regulated whereas in others they are almost free from legal constraints, led 
scholars to question why significant variation in the region exists and why party regula-
tion has taken specific forms in different countries. Even though several explanatory 
factors have been advanced, general agreement exists on the role played by historical 
trajectories, and by democratic (dis)continuity in particular, in shaping the different 
regulatory patterns. Research has shown that it is in particular countries that experi-
enced the collapse of a democratic regime and an authoritarian rule that regulate polit-
ical parties more heavily (Avnon 1995; Pinelli 1984, 2006; Karvonen 2007; van Biezen 
and Borz 2012; Casal Bértoa et al. 2015). Moreover, research has underlined that the 
growing regulation of parties is the result of a changing conception of representative 
democracy and of the role of political parties within it. From a liberal conception that 
perceived political parties as private organizations of citizens, after the end of the Sec-
 
2
 Katz and Mair conceived party regulation, and the introduction of direct public funding to political parties 
in particular, as a means by which established elites could ensure their organizational survival despite their 
decreasing linkages with society and, at the same time, pose barriers to the emergence of new challengers 
(1995, 15). If the increasing dependence of political parties on state resources seems to confirm the for-
mer (cf. Piccio, 2014a, 2014b), no empirical evidence of exclusionary law-making to the detriment of new 
competitors has been found (see Pierre et al.; Scarrow 2006; Piccio and van Biezen 2015, forthcoming).  
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ond World War parties are being perceived as ‘public utilities’, that is agencies “per-
forming a service in which the public has a special interest” (Epstein 1987, 157).3 
Hence, the recognition of the public, positive and desirable role that political parties 
perform in democratic societies has justified the legislative intervention in partisan ac-
tivities, which has taken either the forms of imposing restrictions on parties, or confer-
ring privileges (van Biezen 2008), or both. In their influential 1995 article, Katz and Mair 
offered a different interpretation. On the one hand, the two authors emphasized the 
endogenous nature of party regulation, underlying that parties devise their own legal 
environment. For political finance regulation, this implies that political parties have the 
“effective ability to write their own salary checks” (Katz and Mair 2009, 756). On the 
other hand they argued that by means of party regulation – public funding rules espe-
cially – political parties perpetuate their organizational survival and insulate themselves 
in the state, thereby compensating for their weakening linkages with society. In this 
perspective, party regulation constitutes a powerful instrument that political parties 
exploit in their own advantage.4  
The introduction of rules providing state funding to political parties is of course the 
most obvious indicator suggesting a possible self-serve, instrumental use of party legis-
lation by political actors aimed to strengthen their status and position in the political 
system and the state. This article draws attention to an additional indicator possibly 
pointing in the same direction, concentrating on the functional definitions of political 
parties in European party legislation. As we shall see in the following sections, while 
some of the crucial functions that party scholars have ascribed to political parties are 
considered in decline and a multiplicity of non-partisan actors have emerged challeng-
ing the parties’ monopoly over political representation, party legislation defines politi-
cal parties in terms of a number of ‘eu-functions’. Before turning to the analysis of the 
functional definition of political parties in party legislation, I will discuss the functions 
that scholars have traditionally ascribed to political parties and the contemporary de-
bate on the eroding capacity of the parties to perform some of these functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 On the notion of parties as ‘public utilities’, see van Biezen (2004). 
4
 A similar argument was brought up, in less explicit terms, by Paltiel in the late 1970s. Paltiel argued that 
what prompted public funding “was the desire of legislators to stabilize the party system and entrench the 
electoral position of established groups” (1979, 38). 
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3. Scholarly views on party functions 
 
There are several ways in which political parties can be defined – as organizations, as 
institutions, as social structures – but is difficult to conceive political parties if not in re-
lation to their performance of a certain set of activities. Even in the ‘minimal definition’ 
of political parties provided by Sartori (“any political group identified by an official label 
that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-
free), candidates for public office” (1976, 63)), we find them described in terms of a 
constitutive end. Yet, functional analysis, and the functional analysis of political parties, 
has been widely criticized (see, among others, Schonfeld 1983). Typically, functionalist 
perspectives are objected for being (i) ahistorical: they do not account for social 
change; (ii) conservative: by arguing that certain institutions are necessary they are ac-
tually justifying the existence of the social order as it is; (iii) teleological: they rely on 
the notion that social structures have purposes or goals, and understands political ac-
tors in system benefit terms (“eu-functions”); (iv) subject to selection bias: a value cri-
terion interferes in the selection, in deciding what is, or is not, a party function (Sartori 
2005); and, not least, (v) inadequate for comparative analysis: they rely on assumption 
on the universality of the functions across systems.  
And yet, the functional study of political parties has remained fashionable. Reasons 
why so much attention has been paid to what political parties do or seek to accomplish 
should be found in the very intermediate nature of parties, and in the crucial position 
they occupy between the citizens and the state. Not coincidentally, scholars have re-
turned questioning about party functions as soon as political parties have entered into 
their alleged ‘crisis’. As Webb argued, “if parties are really are in crisis, […] then must it 
not reflect their failure to perform adequately some or all of the key tasks normally im-
puted to them?” (Webb 2005, 637). Hence, and largely intertwined in the debate on 
the crisis of political representation through political parties which is considered as one 
of the major problems of our time (Rosanvallon 2006), studies on the parties’ function-
al performance have been flourishing in the latest decades (Katz 1990; Mair 1998; Gun-
ther and Diamond 2001; Daalder 2001; Webb 2005; Katz and Crotty 2006; Dalton, Far-
rell, McAllister 2011). 
As Mair noticed, a remarkable consensus exists among scholars on what the func-
tions that political parties are expected to perform in democratic polities (Mair 2003, 
7). The “agreed inventory” of party functions (Webb 2005, 637) includes: (1) The inte-
gration and mobilization of the mass public; (2) The articulation and aggregation of in-
terests; (3) The formation of public policy; (4) The structuring of the vote (‘electioneer-
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ing’); (5) The recruitment of political leaders; (6) The organization of parliament and 
government.5 
Scholars, with few exceptions claiming for more nuanced judgments (Webb 2005; 
Dalton, Farrel, and Mc Allister 2011), have pointed to the erosion of the parties’ capaci-
ty to perform the first three functions listed above. With regard to the function of inte-
gration and mobilization of the mass public, Pizzorno argued that the role played by 
political parties in socializing and integrating their members into the political communi-
ty has become “redundant” in more advanced democracies (Pizzorno 1981). On turn, 
the articulation and aggregation of interests, once facilitated by societies based on 
strong social, subcultural and political identities has become more difficult to be per-
formed by parties due to increased heterogeneity, social fragmentation and the conse-
quent diversification of social demands (Andeweg 2003). Additionally, political parties 
lost their previously monopolistic position over political representation, mobilization 
and formation of political identities (Tarrow 1989; Pasquino 1980; Katz 1990), which 
they now share with new political collective actors, such as social movements and oth-
er groups emerged as alternatives to political parties (Schmitter 2001). Policy-making 
functions, finally, have been increasingly challenged by shifts in the decision-making 
loci from the national to the supranational arenas (Mair 1995), and by delegation to 
non-majoritarian institutions (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). Conversely, the degree 
to which political parties are still able to perform the three latter party functions ap-
pears unaltered. Not only they remained principal actors in the functions of election-
eering, recruitment of political leaders and the organization of the parliaments and 
governments, but the parties have become growingly intertwined with the institutional 
domain of politics by means of state dependency, patronage and state regulation (van 
Biezen e Kopecky 2007).  
Bartolini and Mair (2001) proposed a distinction between two broader sets of func-
tions: the representative functions, including the functions of articulation, interest ag-
gregation and formulation of public policies; and the procedural (or institutional) func-
tions, including election campaigning, the recruitment of leaders and candidates, and 
the organization of parliament and government (Bartolini and Mair 2001; Mair 2003).6 
In the light of the changes discussed above and the simultaneous transformations of 
 
5
 For discussions on the functions of political parties, see King 1969; Mair 1998; Gunther and Diamond 
2001; Sartori 2005; Katz and Crotty 2006; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011.  
6
 Similar broad typologies of party functions are presented by Pizzorno (1980), who distinguished between 
the demands’ transmission and exercise of delegation, and more recently by Katz (2014), who distin-
guished between interest articulation and interest aggregation. In both cases, by the first, parties act as 
speakers or “megaphones” of the citizens and by the second they act in the process of governing.  
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party organizations, they contended that contemporary political parties appear more 
adapt to perform the procedural functions, linked to the arena of political institutions, 
rather than the representative ones, linked to the arena of citizens’ representation.  
The erosion of the parties’ representative capacity raises serious concerns about the 
functioning of modern representative democracies. Ignazi (2014) referred to a “reduc-
tion ad electionem” of the party functions, which has led to an erosion of their legiti-
macy (2014, 163). Following the expansion of universal suffrage, political parties have 
acquired a key position in shaping democratic processes, which can by no means be 
sustained by the sole roles of structuring campaign activities and organizing govern-
ments. It is in the perspective of political parties as ‘linkage structures’ (Lawson 1980) 
that political parties are considered as endemic to modern democracies (Schattschnei-
der 1942). As previously mentioned, not all scholars agree with the decline of the par-
ties’ representative capacity. Webb suggested that parties have probably never really 
dominated all of the functions claimed for them (Webb 2005). Dalton, Farrel, and 
McAllister claimed instead that parties have managed to adapt to societal and envi-
ronmental changes in a way to ensure that they continue to fulfil their functions, in-
cluding the one of remaining a crucial linkage between the citizens and the govern-
ment. It would be an exaggeration, they argued, to claim that some of their traditional 
functions have been rendered insignificant (2011, 20-21). This article does not engage 
in the debate on whether contemporary political parties do or do not perform the set 
of functions conventionally ascribed to them, or on how well they perform which set of 
functions vis à vis others. It focuses, instead, on the way in which political parties 
themselves conceive their functions. What are the functions that political parties claim 
to themselves?  
 
 
4. Party functions in party legislation 
 
According to Müller, party laws require that political parties fulfil “certain conditions, 
both in content (e.g., intra-party democracy, acceptance of the democratic order) and 
in form (e.g., party statute, minimal level of activity)” (1993, 421). However, beyond 
‘content’ and ‘form’, and beyond determining who is entitled to be recognized as a po-
litical party, what forms of activity political parties may engage and what forms of in-
ternal organization and political behavior are acceptable for political parties (Katz 2004, 
2-3), party laws also include a number of provisions with no prescriptive meaning and 
no legally binding implications: these are functional definitions of political parties that 
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are included often among the general provisions, preambles or in the very first articles 
of party laws.  
As previously mentioned, not all European countries have codified political parties in 
their Constitutions or have introduced a specific Party Law or Party Finance Law. How-
ever, all thirty-three countries into consideration have regulated political parties in at 
least one of the three main sources of party law. The functional definitions of political 
parties that are taken into consideration for the present analysis require political par-
ties to be the explicit subjects of the norms and require parties to be invested by ex-
plicit functions. The Estonian Party Law may serve as an example:  
 
A political party is a voluntary political association of Estonian citizens and which is 
registered pursuant to the procedure provided for in this Act and the objective of which 
is to express the political interests of its members and supporters and to exercise state 
and local government authority. ([Estonia] Law on Political Parties, article 1.1).  
 
This article provides a specific definition of political parties and defines explicitly 
what functions are ascribed to them: the articulation of citizens’ interests and the or-
ganization of the government. Instead, norms that describe party functions but where 
citizens, rather than parties, appear as the subject of the sentence are not considered 
and will not be included. Article 49 of the Italian Constitution provides an example of 
such a case, where it states that  
 
All citizens shall have the right to associate freely in political parties in order to con-
tribute by democratic means to the determination of national policy. (Italian Constitu-
tion, article 49).  
 
In this article – as often was recalled by Italian constitutional scholars (e.g.: Barbera 
2006; Merlini 2008) – the citizens, not the parties, are the subject of the sentence. It is 
the citizens that participate, by associating in political parties, to the determination of 
national politics. Hence, the function of ‘determination of national politics’ does not 
define political parties. The functional definitions of political parties in party legislation 
are grouped according to the distinction between two sets of party functions present-
ed by Bartolini and Mair (2001). Hence, the ‘representative functions’ heading includes 
norms concerning the functions of integration and mobilization of the mass public, ar-
ticulation and aggregation of interests, and public policy formation; and the ‘procedur-
al functions’ heading includes campaigning activities, leadership recruitment and the 
organization of parliament and government. The party functions mentioned in the 
three main sources of party law in Europe (Constitutions, Party Laws and Party Finance 
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Laws) are summarized in Table 1, covering data from thirty-three countries including 
long-established European democracies and ‘third wave’ democracies in southern and 
in central eastern Europe. 
 
Table 1: Functions of parties in European legislation 
Types of party 
functions 
AU BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IS IT LT LU LV MA NL NO PO PT RO RS SE SI SK SW UA UK N 
Representative 
functions 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ 
   
✓ ✓ ✓ 
   
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 
 
21 
Procedural 
functions  
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
   
✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ 
  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
  
✓ 
 
20 
None 
    
✓ 
         
✓ 
 
✓ 
   
✓ 
 
✓ 
      
✓ 
  
✓ 7 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that the large majority (N = 26) of countries included a defini-
tion of the functions of political parties in either one of the three main sources of party 
law. In three out of the seven countries that do not provide a functional definition of 
political parties, Italy, Czech Republic and Slovakia, references to party functions are 
present but do not define political parties specifically, as they have citizens as subjects 
of the sentence.7  The four other countries, Ireland, Malta, Norway and the UK, charac-
terize more generally for a particularly loose regulation of political parties. None of 
them has adopted a specific Party Law, and the political finance regulations are more 
limited (Piccio 2012).  
The analysis also shows that the majority of the countries introducing functional def-
inition of political parties refer to both their representative and procedural functions, 
and that equal importance is provided to both sets of functions. In particular, expres-
sion and vote structuring appear as the most frequently mentioned ones. The former is 
formulated with reference to the parties’ role in forming and aggregating the citizens’ 
political will, typically with statements such as:  
 
The parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people […]” 
([Germany] The Law on Political Parties, article 1.2)  
 
7
 Both the Czech and the Slovakian Party Laws were first introduced in 1993 after the dissolution of Czech-
oslovakia, and include minimal amendments to the ‘Act on Associating in Political Parties and Political 
Movements’ adopted by Czechoslovakia in 1991. Hence, both Party Laws of 1993 open with the following 
article: “Citizens are entitled to associate in political parties and political movements (hereinafter only 
“political parties and movements”). By exercising this right, they are able to take part in political life, above 
all in formation of legislative assemblies, bodies of higher self-governing territorial units and local self-
governing authorities“ (art. 1.1).  
 
Daniela R. Piccio, Party regulation as self.legitimizing system 
  
128 
 
 
Political parties assist in the formation and expression of citizens’ political will through 
elections or other democratic means. ([Bulgaria] Political Parties Act, article 2.2)  
 
They [i.e. political parties] are the expression of pluralism and they contribute to the 
formulation and expression of popular will. ([Spain] Organic Law 3/1987 of 2 July on the 
financing of political parties, Preamble) 
 
In some countries, laws define party functions in great detail covering the whole 
range of party functions traditionally ascribed to political parties by party scholars. 
Consider, for example, the Portuguese Party Law, dedicating a specific article on the 
purposes of political parties.  
 
The purposes of political parties shall be:  
 
a) To contribute to the pluralist enlightenment of citizens and to the exercise of their 
freedoms and political rights;  
b) To study and debate the problems of political, economic, social and cultural life at na-
tional and international level;  
c) To present political programmes and prepare election manifestoes;  
d) To submit candidatures for democratically representative elected bodies;  
e) Particularly from an opposition standpoint, to criticise the activities of the various bod-
ies that belong to the State, the Autonomous Regions, local authorities and the interna-
tional organisations to which Portugal belongs;  
f) To participate in the clarification of issues which are submitted to national, regional or 
local referendum;  
g) To promote the training and political preparation of citizens for a direct and active 
participation in democratic public life;  
h) In general, to help promote fundamental rights and freedoms and the development of 
democratic institutions. ([Portugal] Law governing Political Parties. Organisational Law 
no. 2/2003 of 22 August 2003, art. 2).  
 
A similar level of detail appears in the legislation on political party of Germany, the 
“heartland of party law” (Müller and Sieberer 2005, 435), and in Eastern European 
countries such as Romania and Slovenia.8  Moreover, functional norms on political par-
ties have also been established in the legislation on political parties of the European 
 
8
 A more detailed breakdown of the intensity of party regulation by function and by country is presented in 
Piccio, 2015 (forthcoming).  
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Union. Under article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union, “(p)olitical parties at Eu-
ropean level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the 
will of citizens of the Union”.9 As Mair and Thomassen remarked with reference to the 
latter regulation, “despite its phrasing as an empirical statement, this is obviously 
meant in a normative sense” (2010, 23). Indeed, the presence of such a detailed ac-
count of party functions in legislation is not self-evident, as these are purely program-
matic statements with no legally binding or prescriptive implications. The presence of 
such norms seems to provide additional evidence for Katz and Mair’s core argument 
that parties use legislation instrumentally, to strengthen their position within the state. 
By referring to their ‘eu-functions’ for democracy, legislators (which is political parties) 
seem to be willing to self-legitimize their institutional centrality. The timing of the in-
troduction of these norms points to a similar interpretation. Table 2, which shows the 
year in which both the functional definitions of political parties and the provisions for 
direct public funding were first established,10 shows that in the majority of cases func-
tional definitions were introduced concomitantly or after the introduction of direct 
public funding to political parties, allegedly as a way to justify the material benefits de-
riving from it. 
Indeed, in 11 countries the two provisions were introduced in the same legal docu-
ment, and in 4 countries such functional definitions were established after the intro-
duction of public funding. Moreover, with the relevant exceptions of Austria and 
France where three decades separate the establishment of the two rules, a closer look 
at the 10 countries where functional definitions preceded the introduction of state 
subventions reveals that public funding provisions very closely followed the introduc-
tion of functional definitions, thus very likely being introduced within the same political 
environment. The temporal sequence seems to further support a self-serve interpreta-
tion for the presence of functional definitions of political parties in European countries’ 
legal frameworks. Scholars observed that the introduction of public funding has re-
quired greater intervention from the state in the parties’ activities, entailing the estab-
lishment of rules providing their definition and legal status, and more generally a codi-
fied system of party registration and control (Mair 1998; Scarrow 2011). However, a list 
of the parties’ ‘eu-functions’ does not serve as a requirement for public funding to be 
disbursed. It may serve instead as a normative justification for it.  
 
 
9
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/3, 
30.3.2010, art. 10.4. 
10
 The table does not include the seven countries that did not introduce a functional definition of political 
parties, nor does it include Switzerland which provides no direct public funding to political parties. 
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Table 2: Functional definitions and direct public funding (year introduced) 
Belgium (FD & PF: 1989) – Bulgaria (FD & PF: 1990) – Croatia (FD & PF: 1993) – Denmark 
(FD & PF: 1987) – Estonia (FD & PF: 1994)  – Finland (FD & PF: 1969) – Hungary (FD & PF: 
1989) – Iceland (FD & PF: 2006)  – Luxembourg (FD & PF: 1999) – Netherlands (FD & PF: 
1999) – Slovenia (FD & PF: 1994)  
Same law  
(n = 11) 
Cyprus (FD: 2001; PF: 1991) – Romania (FD: 1991; PF: 1990)  – Sweden (FD: 1974; PF: 
1965) 
After 
(n = 4) 
Austria (FD: 1945; PF: 1975) – France (FD: 1958; PF: 1988) – Germany (FD: 1949; PF: 
1957)–– Greece (FD: 1975; PF: 1984) – Lithuania (FD: 1990; PF: 1999) – Latvia (FD: 2006; 
PF: 2010) – Poland (FD: 1990; PF: 1993) – Portugal (FD: 1974; PF: 1977) – Spain (FD: 
1978; PF: 1977) – Ukraine (FD: 1996; PF: 2003) 
Before 
(n = 10) 
Key: FD = Functional Definition; PF = Public Funding 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
 
Party regulation has often been portrayed as an important instrument for warrant-
ing responsive, responsible and corruption-free parties and for ensuring, more in gen-
eral, democracy to function properly. According to conventional wisdom, in the current 
climate in which political parties find themselves in a crisis of political representation, 
party legislation is a means by which parties can regain public confidence and re-
establish their political legitimacy.11 Yet, despite the increasing interference of Europe-
an states in party affairs, research has shown that greater regulation does not result in 
more attractive, trusted, corruption-free parties (Whiteley 2014; Casal Bértoa et al. 
2014; Piccio, Di Mascio, and Natalini 2014). Never in Western Europe have levels of 
mistrust of political parties been so high, the level of corruption in Europe is thought to 
have risen in recent years, while symptoms of societal disaffection have mushroomed 
throughout the continent. All in all, it appears that party regulation has not achieved its 
desired aims.  
Lacking effectiveness is not the only problem of party regulation. Another problem-
atic aspect lies in its endogenous nature, as parties act as “both those entities that con-
struct the rules and those who play by them” (Gauja 2013, 10). Numerous scholars 
 
11
 The Italian debate on the necessity to introduce a Party Law is illustrative, as party regulation has been 
presented by political actors and mainstream media as a panacea that would cure the deep crisis of legiti-
macy of the Italian representative institutions. Noticeably, the Guidelines on Political Party Regulation 
adopted in 2011 by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and OSCE Office for Democratic Insti-
tutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) emphasize that states should try to avoid interfering in party affairs. 
The Guidelines state explicitly: “a specific law for political parties is not necessary for the proper function-
ing of democracy, and may be most effective when quite minimal in its scope” (p. 31).  
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have stressed upon the self-serve potential of party regulation and on the inherent 
conflict of interest arising as legislators are also partisans (e.g. Paltiel 1979; Nass-
macher 1993; Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Gauja 2010; Piccio 2014a). Party regulation 
constitutes a powerful instrument that political parties may exploit in their own ad-
vantage. Rather than ensuring democracy to function properly and restoring the legit-
imacy of parties in the public eye, it can be used by political elites to further their own 
interests.  
The provision of direct public funding to political parties is a clear indicator of a situ-
ation by which parties grant themselves privileges and status, and by which the state 
becomes, as Katz and Mair argued, an “institutional structure of support” (1995, 16). 
This article centered on a second indicator possibly pointing in the same direction, 
drawing attention to the establishment of functional definitions of political parties in 
European party legislation. Two are the main empirical findings that emerged. First, the 
large majority of European countries included a definition of the functions of political 
parties in either one of the three main sources of party law. Indeed, party laws in Eu-
rope do not only define the formal, procedural and organizational requirements that 
parties must possess, but they also provide normative and non-prescriptive definitions 
of the functions that parties perform, with equal emphasis being provided to the rep-
resentative and the procedural functions. Second, an analysis of the timing by which 
functional definitions and public funding provisions have been introduced showed that 
in the large majority of the cases the two norms were established (virtually) concomi-
tantly.  
Legal provisions on political parties have often been observed as manifestation of an 
underlying vision of the parties’ role, form and place within the democratic polity (Per-
sily and Cain 2000; Gauja 2010; van Biezen and Borz 2012). Overall, party laws and 
Constitutions point to a conception of political parties as democratically desirable insti-
tutions (van Biezen 2008 2014). And yet, it is the parties’ underlying vision that emerg-
es in party rules and it is the parties themselves who claim their democratically desira-
bility. Portraying themselves, by means of the law, as actors performing crucial func-
tions for democracy, parties created a self-legitimizing system in which they justify 
their institutional centrality. The circularity of this argument is shown in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Party regulation as a self-legitimizing system 
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Mair mentioned the “extraordinary capacity of parties to ensure their own survival” 
(1995, 22) and that party legislation is a means that political parties use to further this 
end. The introduction of a list of ‘eu-functions’ of political parties can be interpreted in 
a similar manner, as an additional indicator pointing in the same direction. Here, privi-
leges are neither material nor tangible as they are in the case of financial subventions, 
but yet they do strengthen the status of political parties within the system and protect 
them, as ‘eu-functional’ performers, as part of the state. 
Various objections against this argument might be raised. First, it may be argued 
that it leaves the question open as to whether political parties actually act based on in-
strumental considerations. Inferring motivations for elected officials to act in one way 
or another is indeed problematic. Scholars working on the determinants of electoral 
institutions, another regulatory environment characterized by endogeneity and (poten-
tially) being subject to lawmakers’ self-interested calculations, contend that pure self-
interest calculations are too simplistic and ultimately incomplete explanations for un-
derstanding party behavior when establishing electoral reform (Bowler, Donovan, and 
Karp 2006; Bol 2013; Harfst 2013). Both power maximization and value-driven motives 
are valid approaches, as “each one captures a significant part of the real-world story, 
but each leaves much to be explained” (Renwick 2010, 9). References to party func-
tions in European legislation and the particular emphasis provided to the parties’ rep-
resentative role may reflect a genuine and authentic ambition of party actors. Many of 
these norms, in Eastern Europe especially, were introduced in the years immediately 
following the democratic transition and strongly associate political parties with essen-
tial democratic values and principles, such as political participation, pluralism, competi-
tion and popular sovereignty (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014). In other words, regu-
lations of this type could be conceived as an ideal model that parties aim to achieve, 
the role of parties being considered as crucial for the expressive and procedural linkag-
es to be maintained between the citizens and the state. Hence, the argument that po-
litical parties have established a functionalist type of legislation responding to a self-
serve, self-legitimizing logic should be argued with due caution. Further empirical re-
search may contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the political actors’ moti-
vation. Several are the possible trajectories of research. An analysis of the specific his-
torical and institutional contexts which lead political actors to establish functional defi-
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nitions of parties may bring to the fore specific path-dependent processes or critical 
junctures. Digitalized parliamentary proceedings, increasingly available across Europe-
an countries, may constitute a highly relevant source of analysis. Another option is to 
contrast cases where functional definitions are present with cases where they are ab-
sent verifying the relevant intervening variables at stake.  
Secondly, one might object that the argument of self-legitimation by means of regu-
lation (i.e.: the circularity presented in figure 1) is not new. Several are the legal theo-
rists who have stressed upon the intimate relation existing between law, politics, and 
democracy (see Caldeira, Kelemen, and Whittington 2008 for a recent review). Geddis, 
for example, underlined that “a legal system heavily relies on its democratic genesis for 
its legitimacy; yet democracy only ever exists in a procedural form created and con-
trolled by the law” (2003, 1). Political parties operate as intermediary agents in that re-
lationship, both setting up and being controlled by legal rules. And yet, for a legitimate 
interaction between the rule of law and the democratic principle, the system must be 
capable of reflecting the aspiration of the people. Thus, when we observe the presence 
of such statements and we simultaneously consider the ongoing crisis of political rep-
resentation in contemporary Europe, the circularity of the model appears under a dif-
ferent light. Previous studies on party legislation pointed out that party laws have 
evolved and developed standards that appear obsolete. In particular, scholars noted a 
tendency of party law to privilege the outdated model of the mass party with noticea-
ble discrepancies existing between the political reality and the legal rules (Gauja 2013; 
van Biezen and Piccio 2013; Katz 2014). This holds in particular with respect to legal 
prescriptions on the parties’ internal organizational functioning, such as minimum 
membership requirements (while membership-based parties are considered as belong-
ing to the past, see van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke  2013), or organizational presence 
on the territory (while parties, using ICTs as communication tools, are increasingly less 
territorially-anchored, see Römmele 2003). The inclusion of functional definitions of 
political parties and the particular emphasis provided to the representative functions 
leads to similar considerations. We find parties defined as representative agents not-
withstanding the fact that their representative capacity has been eroding and has been 
taken over by other agencies of political expression that developed beyond parties (in-
terest groups and social movements) and who might arguably do a better job in terms 
of citizens’ representation (Schmitter 2001). Ignazi referred to the “inevitable disap-
pearance of the traditional party functions, tailored to societal traits of the past” (2014, 
164). Interestingly, while such functions have disappeared in social reality, they ac-
quired a legal status, becoming part of the legal frameworks on political parties in Eu-
rope.  
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This analysis suggests that the endogenous nature of party regulation poses impor-
tant challenges to democracy and has the potential to undermine democracy’s funda-
mental principles of political pluralism and free competition. Further examinations on 
the interaction between political parties, their lawmaking activity and democracy, and 
greater cross-fertilization between the scholarly literatures on political parties, political 
jurisprudence and legal theory would be therefore extremely valuable. 
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